{"id":1441,"date":"2022-05-07T16:47:20","date_gmt":"2022-05-07T15:47:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/seminar-series-in-analytic-philosophy-2021-22-session-27\/"},"modified":"2022-05-07T16:47:20","modified_gmt":"2022-05-07T15:47:20","slug":"seminar-series-in-analytic-philosophy-2021-22-session-27","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cful.demiurgos.eu\/lancog\/seminar-series-in-analytic-philosophy-2021-22-session-27\/","title":{"rendered":"Seminar Series in Analytic Philosophy 2021-22, Session 27"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Justified belief for Gnostics<\/strong><br \/>\nJulien Dutant (King\u2019s College London)<\/p>\n<p>13 May 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time \u2013 WET) | Sala Mattos Rom\u00e3o (Departamento de Filosofia)<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>Abstract: <\/strong>According the Lockean view, it is justified to believe P iff it\u2019s rational to have a high credence in P. A theory of degrees of justification fits this view well: the degree to which one is justified in believing P is one\u2019s rational credence in P. On that theory degrees of justification obey the probability axioms. I give reasons to prefer an alternative, the \u201cprobable knowledge\u201d view, according to which it is justified to believe P iff it\u2019s rational to have a high credence that one knows P (or is in a position to know P). A theory of degrees of justification fits that view well: the degree of which one is justified in believing P is one\u2019s rational credence that one knows (or is in a position to know) P. On that theory, degrees of justification typically violate the probability axioms. I explore their shape; in particular, I show that under the assumption that knowledge obeys the normal logic KT, degrees of justification turn out to be Belief functions (aka Dempster-Shafer belief functions).<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><em>The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at &lt;info@lancog.com&gt; until a day before the event.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Justified belief for Gnostics Julien Dutant (King\u2019s College London) 13 May 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time \u2013 WET) | Sala Mattos Rom\u00e3o (Departamento de Filosofia) &nbsp; Abstract: According the Lockean view, it is justified to believe P iff it\u2019s rational to have a high credence in P. A theory of degrees of justification fits this view [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"activitypub_content_warning":"","activitypub_content_visibility":"","activitypub_max_image_attachments":4,"activitypub_interaction_policy_quote":"anyone","activitypub_status":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1441","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.demiurgos.eu\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1441","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.demiurgos.eu\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.demiurgos.eu\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.demiurgos.eu\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.demiurgos.eu\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1441"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cful.demiurgos.eu\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1441\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.demiurgos.eu\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1441"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.demiurgos.eu\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1441"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.demiurgos.eu\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1441"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}